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UNCTAD Conferences have aroused scepticism
in previous editors of the JDS Bulletin. The
issue devoted to UNCTAD III begins with the
words 'Those who still entertained fond hopes
that UNCTAD, in its present form, could help
bring about a more equitable distribution of
income among the world's nations should have
few remaining illusions after the third Con-
ference in Santiago' (ÏDS Bulletin 1973: 1).
Three years later, in the run-up to the fourth
Conference, the editorial beean with a spoof
dictionary definition of UNCTAD as 'a gathering
at which hostility is veiled by expression of high-
minded sentiment, and constructive action
thwarted by pa.ssage of elusive resolutions'
(IDS Bulletin 1976: 2). How pleasant it would be
to strike a more optimistic note in this, the
third issue to concentrate on an UNCTAD
assembly. And how encouraging. both for the
ldcs and for those of us in the industrialised
world whose work assumes the feasibility of
negotiated change in the international economy.
Alas, the proceedings of the fifth UNCTAD Con-
ference held in Manila from 7 May to 1 June
1979, only reinforce the scepticism. Naturally, it
is possible to find some crumbs of hope. Indeed
it is important to identify such minor achieve-
ments if only to set the record straight; one of
the major problems with full-frontal economic
diplomacy in the UNCTAD mould is that the
media pick up the conflicts and ignore compro-
mises on the sound journalistic principle that
'good news is no news'.
The articles in this Bulletin take up the
challenge of presenting a balanced appraisal of
the events at Manila. Nonetheless, their overall
tenor is of gloom. The ldcs' tactics were poor.
Worse, the new splits among them may be less
easily cemented than has been possible in the
past since they arise from major differences of
interest. But if the ldcs' performance was bad,
the dcs' was worse. UNCTAD Conferences are
surely predicated, despite their aura of con-
frontation, on the willingness of dcs to concede
international reforms that can be shown to be
in their own interests. It may be naive to expect
them voluntarily to accept changes that favour
the ldcs at their expense. But surely at a time
of what Green calls 'the rising new international
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economic disorder' it should be especially possible
to identify, and secure agreement on, a handful
of changes that really are mutually beneficial?
Apparently not.
Why were the achievements of UNCTAD V so
disappointing? Some commentators blame the
Idcs for wasting the first half of the Conference
on internal wrangling. Others lay responsibility
for the slow start on the dcs which should have
responded to the Arusha programme of the
Group of 77 (UNCTAD (1) 1979). A third group
accuses the UNCTAD Secretariat of so mis-
handling the agenda that it lacked focus. It is
important to assess the validity of these claims
since they have very different implications for the
future. If the root problem was poor ldc tactics
or a weak agenda, then an improvement in either
might produce better results. But dc intran-
sigence would suggest a less hopeful future. The
articles in this Bulletin address all three propo-
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sitions and provide the reader with sufficient
information to make a tentative judgement.
What were the prospects for UNCTAD V?
Early in 1979, they did not appear bright, but
neither did they seem totally gloomy. UNCTAD
IV in May 1976 had set a useful precedent with
a different atmosphere from that of earlier con-
ferences; at that stage, the oil crisis had visibly
shifted the world balance of power, while the
Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly
had engendered an atmosphere of consensus
which the dcs were reluctant to jeopardise, par-
ticularly in view of progress at the concurrent
CTEC talks in Paris. UNCTAD IV had thus been
able to break new ground on the Common Fund,
external debt, and the transfer of technology.
Although progress since 1976 on these topics had
been very slow, as UNCTAD V approached at
least some donors had adjusted the terms of past
loans to the least developed countries and there
seemed every chance that an agreement would be
reached on the Common Fund, as indeed it was
in March 1979.
By 1979, however, the world economic climate
had altered significantly for the worse, and it
was realised that this deterioration would
undoubtedly affect the Manila Conference. It
gave rise, on the ldc side, to a new set of
problems and demands. The topics expected to be
aired at UNCTAD V were therefore: the
adverse movement in the ldc terms of trade,
the new protectionism among the dcs, and the
unprecedented balance of payments deficits of
many ldcs, coupled with the inadequacy of pay-
ments support facilities. In sum, it was antici-
pated that the keynote of UNCTAD V would be
structural change in the world economy, with
the ldcs wanting to get more out of it, to have
more control over it, and to change international
institutions so they can help advance these goals.
While the ldcs' objectives at Manila were
relatively straightforward, those of the dcs were
much more problematic. One viewpoint that has
been strongly urged,' is that dcs, particularly
Britain, are ill-served by the minimalist policies
of Group B towards development questions.
Rich countries have much to gain from taking
more positive action towards the ldcsby
increasing aid and other financial flows, by
facilitating international relocation of many types
1 Not least at an IDS Conference in February 1979, which
was one of a series of meetings in various countries
sponsored by the UNCTAD Secretariat to articulate opinion
before UNCTAD V.
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of production, and by improving access for ldcs'
exports of manufactures. Those arguing this pro-
position are able to draw on a substantial body of
economic theory to justify their case; this has
recently been reinforced by the report of the
OECD Interfutures team which cites a series of
critical mutual interests (OECD 1979). They
deplore the dc lack of initiative, which they are
at a loss to understand, except by analogy with
the 'prisoners' dilemma', where inability to
coordinate actions leads to a sub-optimal strategy
being adopted.
The stock-in-trade defence against such views is
simply to absorb and neutralise them. Of course
the dcs, and Britain in particular, have much to
gain from ldc economic development; govern-
ment policies are designed to achieve this, as far
as normal domestic political pressures allow.
Hence, supporters of the UK record can point
to debt relief accorded to the least developed
countries at a 'cost' to the Exchequer up to the
year 2000 of £900 mn, and to the fact that the
Department of Trade has resisted protectionist
demands to a marked degree. It is argued,
furthermore, that this has taken place against
the background of an increasing ldc share in
world trade, with dc imports from non-oil ldcs
growing at a faster rate than imports from any
other group of countries. At the beginning of
1979, official spokesmen could be optimistic
about the chances for increased aid as a pro-
portion of GNP, despite the recession. since the
Bonn Summit had recommended an increase in
the transfer of resources and the UK Govern-
ment of the day was committed to a rate of
growth in aid over the next three years which
was faster than the planned rate of increase in
any other sector of public expenditure. Subse-
quent events, notably the change of Government
in Britain, have shown such optimism to be
unfounded, at least as far as Britain is concerned.
Charitable observers assumed that the reticence
of officials in the UK in the period before
UNCTAD V was simply a result of the uncer-
tainty engendered by the forthcoming elections.
Whatever the cause, it became increasingly
clear that the British policy was to sit tight. It
was freely admitted that Britain had a broad
interest in the topics to be covered at Manila.
But far from counselling initiative, the recog-
nition of this wide span of interest seemed to
urge caution. When asked about Britain's position
on the Conference agenda, the typical official
response was to guess at likely Group of 77
demands. This could be taken as an attempt to
side-step the question, but the truth of the
matter is that it was very indicative. The Govern-
ment's position, as evidenced by tactics at Manila,
was one of passive (and often negative) response
to Group of 77 initiatives.
Conferences can be classified into types, and
unfortunately it became increasingly likely that
Manila would develop into a type with little
scope. The first is the focus conference, where
a limited number of issues is raised and 'in
principle' agreements are made which will be
fleshed out in detailed negotiations subsequently.
UNCTAD V lacked the early preparation which
would have made this kind of joint concentration
on selected issues possible. Second. there is the
moderate conference, which reaches agreement
on a number of small, tinkering reforms, to be
finalised later. To be this, UNCTAD V would
have needed a set of detailed position papers on
each issue, and these did not exist. The Manila
Conference was closer to a third typehigh level
seminars like the World Employment Conference
or the World Population Conference. Such dis-
cussions can be useful, but this was not what
many expected of an UNCTAD Conference, and
certainly not what the Group of 77 wanted.
It is unlikely that, even with hindsight, UNCTAD
V will come to be regarded as a landmark in
the sense of a turning point in history. Never-
theless, any UNCTAD Conference, simply by
virtue of the hullabaloo surrounding it. is a land-
mark in the sense of a conspicuous point
against which to measure progress. The articles
in this Bulletin help to measure that progress,
and to suggest future directions for North and
South alike.
Marc Williams begins with an overview of
Group of 77 politics: how the Group functions,
how it has developed, and how it fared at Manila.
He fears that although the Group has weathered
many storms in the past and has well-devel-
oped machinery for accommodating differences
between members, the disputes that arose before
and during UNCTAD V may be less amenable to
traditional remedies. In the past, the 77 argued
over the best means for redistributing dc wealth.
Now, they are also arguing about distributing
resources within the Third World. One test
case will be the outcome of the dialogue on
petroleum pricing and soft loans to ide importers
begun at Manila and continued at the Havana
non-aligned summit Stephany Griffith-Jones and
Ann Weston examine what was actually achieved
at Manila. Griffith-Jones considers financial
issues, and describes the ldcs' demands for inter-
national monetary reform and an increase in the
transfer of official resources. She argues that
existing trade adjustment mechanisms tend to
discriminate against the development efforts of
ldcs, and that the measures agreed at UNCTAD
V will not produce a significant improvement.
Weston points out that, of the 12 substantive
items on the agenda, four dealt wholly with
trade and a further five made detailed reference
to it. She focuses on the dc and ide positions on
these trade issues, and describes how consensus
was achieved or, more often, not achieved on
each item.
The picture painted by Griffith-Jones and
Weston is sombre in tone. In contrast, I. S.
Chadha writes on one of the success stories, the
Integrated Programme for Commodities. He
takes issue with the sceptics who see little family
resemblance between the sturdy baby born after
a difficult labour in Nairobi, and the callow
youth who made his appearance last March. The
young man has hidden depths, according to
Chadha, and should sire a healthy line of inter-
national commodity agreements. The perspective
of Anthony Renouf, who examines UNCTAD's
other bright spot, the Liner Code, is quite
different. With victories like the Liner Code, he
argues, who needs defeats! Many readers will
want to disagree with his analysis, but they
cannot ignore it.
Part II of the Bulletin looks to the future.
Reginald Herbold Green2 draws lessons from ¡dc
tactics at UNCTAD V and applies them to
negotiations in GATT. The Ides have an uphill
struggle, but that is all the more reason why
their tactics should be well thought out. They
have traditionally viewed GATT with mistrust,
and have sought in UNCTAD a forum more
sympathetic to their special needs. This may have
been a correct approach in the 1960s, but in the
much harsher international environment of the
1980s, the Ides may well find that GATT affords
a more substantial defence against the accele-
rating bandwagon of protectionism. Richard Jolly
launches a broadside at the bandwagon itself.
A massive transfer of resources from North to
South could stimulate economic activity on both
sides and remove the stimulus to protection. He
examines a number of simulations of the effects
of such a transfer; one estimate is that a
transfer of an additional $20 bn annually could
create some 500,000 jobs in the industrial
countries. The concept of a massive transfer of
resources has received support from influential
2 The editors would like to acknowledge Reginald Green's
valuable help in editing this Bulletin.
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quarters in the North, not least from the Chair-
man of the OECD's Development Assistance
Committee.3 Nonetheless, most Northern govern-
ments are still unpersuaded; a clear priority for
the development lobby in the industrialised
world is the task of persuading them.
In the meantime, the South should look to itself
for a solution to its own problems. Or so Helen
O'Neill and Vincent Cable argue. O'Neill
examines the need for economic cooperation
among ldcs (ECDC). One of the more positive
achievements of UNCTAD V was a consensus
resolution on ECDC which O'Neill applauds.
The ldcs have much to gain by increasing
collective self-reliance but, she warns, the very
forces that restrict them to a dependent role in
the world economy are likely to hinder attempts
to use ECDC to break out of this dependency.
Finally. Vincent Cable examines the history of
regional integration in the Third World, which
is somewhat dismal. However, his conclusions are
far from dismal since he identifies a package of
modest new measures which avoid the pitfalls of
integration but which, taken together, could
prove a powerful bond and enable the South to
negotiate more effectively with the North.
The potential scapegoats for the failure at
Manila are the Group of 77 with its poor tactics,
the UNCTAD Secretariat and its weak agenda,
and the intransigent dcs. The evidence of the
See OECD (1979a), in which the Committee Chairman,
Ambassador Lewis, advocates increased transfers to
facilitate trade expansion, break the protectionist spiral, and
unleash the dynamic forces of the market.
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articles that follow certainly suggests that the
dcs were intransigent. This conclusion may not
cause much surprise among readers, but it
should cause alarm. While the dcs remain
intransigent the prospects for a significant
improvement in future North-South bargaining
sessions are poor. Yet pessimism should not lead
to inertia. In the North the short-sightedness of
governments should be the cue for renewed
efforts to demonstrate areas of mutual advantage.
Northern intransigence is a symptom of the
failure to perceive the link between the Third
World and domestic issues of employment,
inflation and economic dynamism. In the South,
there is a clear need for tactics to be
re-examined and improved, and for ldcs to
strengthen economic collaboration, both as an
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